I've been having multiple conversations each day about interpreting what's going on in Iran and how this is going to turn out, mostly with people who know considerably more than I or at least talk like they do. So I thought I'd give a rundown of some of the more popular/interesting theories among the journalists and Iranian expats I've been hanging out with. Apologies for the use of names/Iranian political terms without explanation.
1) Elite revolt by Rafsanjani, Larijani et al is far from finished, and it will be behind closed doors, and not out in the street, that change will come. I found this theory compelling a few weeks ago, but if you look at the recent conciliatory words of Rafsanjani and even Mohammad Khatami--even as Moussavi and Karroubi (I think quite surprisingly) stand firm--about really things being up to the Rahbar (Khamenei) to decide etc, I don't think there's any indication that, for example, Rafsanjani would move to impeach Khamenei or try to change the leadership structure to a council of clerics (as suggested here) through the Expediency Council (Assembly of Experts? same thing? I always get these confused).
2) It makes no sense for Khamenei to have hand-picked Ahmedinejad and continue to stand behind him uncompromisingly, destroying any legitimacy he retains as neutral mediator. Moussavi would have presented a much more acceptable face to the world while maintaining a deeply conservative social agenda. Perhaps this is just a question of old emnities from the 80s--when Moussavi as PM clashed with then Pres Khamenei especially over the economy with Khomenei taking Moussavi's side more often than not--dying hard.
3) Or, this is a silent coup by the Revolutionary Guards, and less a question of Khamenei single-handedly choosing Ahmedinejad than of RG cadres gradually taking the reins of actual power to where they can now more or less compell Khamenei to play ball and stand behind their candidate. The vacuum created by the purges of reformists from government, universities, and the media will be filled with yet more former RG types, making the post-election movement to a certain extent counter-productive and solidifying the military elite's strangehold on the political sphere. *Most people I talk to still tend to refer to the regime in the singular or as some ambiguously-defined but monolithic "them" or "the powers that be" (many also are convinced Ahmedinejad is just a puppet) but I tend to think such simplification can be misleading and ignore shifts in the balance of power among the hardline elite.
4) Like 1979, this will turn into a slow-burning but irresistible revolt. This I've heard mostly from expat Iranians: in 1978-1979 there were piecemeal revolts in Qom, then later Tabriz, etc that only slowly and fitfully gained real force. Also like back then, todays protesters were an incredibly diverse mix of people with not much uniting them ideologically or communally, hence it will take time for the movement/revolt to gain organizational coherence (the guys at Trend, a magazine I'm working for here, are already calling it The Iranian Revolution).
5) No cracks have formed in the elite security forces so far, even as normal cops were at the height of the protest cited as waving to protests, flashing V's for victory, etc. Unless this happens there's no hope of any street movement or other activism being successful (I myself think it would be fascinating to sit and talk with some Basijis/riot cops and know what exactly is going through their head when, after being religiously indoctrinated since they were little kids, they're beating people for chanting 'God is Great,' which they doubtless learned was a signature form of protest of 1979. I wondering what their commanders are telling them about the chanters being foreign proxies etc that successfully motivates them).
6)Thus, it will be very tempting for those pissed off and disillusioned to take up arms (though firearms are currently hard to come by except in outlying provinces, proximity to Iraq and Afghanistan and already-functional smuggling routes for heroin from the latter mean that this could potentially change fast) and the failure of (relatively) peaceful protest may prompt a resurgence of armed groups like the Mujahideen-e Khalq or formation of new, more mainstream ones.
That's all that's coming to mind right now; I'll probably add to this post later.
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